Abstract. Solutions for an easy and secure setup of a wireless connection between two devices are urgently needed for WLAN, Wireless USB, Bluetooth and similar standards for short range wireless communication. In this paper we analyse the SAS protocol by Vaudenay and propose a new three round protocol MA-3 for mutual data authentication based on a cryptographic commitment scheme and short manually authenticated out-of-band messages. We show that non-malleability of the commitment scheme is essential for the security of the SAS and the MA-3 schemes and that extractability or equivocability do not imply non-malleability. We also give new proofs of security for the SAS and MA-3 protocols and suggestions how to instantiate the MA-3 protocol in practise.
Introduction
The pairing problem. In quest for easy and secure setup of a wireless connection between two devices many new solutions have recently been, or are currently being developed. Most urgently such a solution is needed for WLAN, as homes are being equipped with WLAN access points; the home users should have a clear and manageable procedure to set up a secure WLAN which makes it easy to add and remove devices from the network. The Wireless Protected Access (WPA) by Wi-Fi Alliance provides encryption and authentication but is still today delivered with a common secret key for all users. The WiFi Alliance is working on a more secure solution [KW04, INQ05] . Also the Wireless USB has launched a similar initiative on, what is called as, Association Models [Hun05] . For Bluetooth the problem of secure connection set up has a longer history [GPS04] . The standard Bluetooth Pairing mechanism is based on symmetric cryptography, and is typically not very well implemented. On the other hand, experiences from Bluetooth have shown what kind of the security and usability requirements one is faced with.
Using Diffie-Hellman or some other public key based key exchange the problem of establishing a shared secret over an insecure wireless channel is reduced to the problem of preventing an active online man-in-the-middle, that is, to the problem of authentication of the public keys. It is common to assume existence of some auxiliary user operated communication channel, over which some limited amount of confidential or authenticated information is exchanged between the devices. For the evolution of manual data authentication and authenticated key exchange protocols see [GMN04, Hoe05, Vau05] . The auxiliary channels, also called as out-of-band (OOB) channels, can be classified according to the types of interfaces they use with the devices. Basically, as interfaces are either input or output, there are three possible combinations for the device interfaces used at the ends of the OOB channel: input-input (I/I), output-input (O/I), output-output (O/O). Given such channels, possibly with different capabilities, bandwidths and security, one can develop suitable operations to authenticate data for the devices, or what is the same, verify that some piece of data established over the insecure channel is the same in both devices. In [GMN04] three authentication protocols, one for each basic interface combination was presented: MANA I using O/I device interfaces, MANA II for O/O device interfaces, and MANA III for I/I device interfaces. MANA I and MANA II use short message authentication codes computed form the data and compared over the channel. In MANA III a shared secret password is entered to both devices and randomised verification takes place over the insecure channel. The probability of success of a man-in-the-middle in these protocols is about 2 − , if is the length of the message authentication code in MANA I and MANA II, or the length of the password in MANA III. However, MANA I and MANA II are not optimal, in the sense that the string to be compared must also include the key, also of length , for the message authentiction code. It is also important to note that MANA I and MANA III require that the OOB channel preserves confidentiality, while MANA II requires only an authenticated OOB channel.
Protocols that are suitable to handle use cases with I/I interfaces can be easily transformed to protocols for O/I scenario. Instead of entering a password to the devices, it can be generated in one device which outputs it to be entered to the second device. Similarly, an O/O scenario can be adapted to O/I interfaces be giving the task of comparing the values to the device with input-interface. Therefore, a set of two protocols, where one protocol is suited for I/I scenario with a secret password, and another one handles the O/O scenario with a short authenticated string, covers the three basic interface scenarios.
For I/I scenario, there is a wealth of protocols known as password based key agreement protocols, e.g. [BM92, KOY01] . Being designed for the client-server authentication these protocols are designed to allow reuse of the password. This is not a necessary requirement when setting up a secure connection between two peer devices, and typically increases computational complexity of the procedure. Complexity is further incresed by implementing secure storage of secrets by the client and the server. The basic EKE protocol [BM92] without password protection does not have unnecessary complexity and is well suited for secure connection set up between peer devices. MANA III provides another good solution to the problem. The scenario using output interfaces in both devices has some advantages, as the user need not enter any random strings, but only compare them. Therefore it is forseen that a manual authentication protocol will be required to support this scenario. Recently, Vaudenay presented a manual authentication protocol using short authenticted strings [Vau05] . From the point-of-view of interfaces, as well as security, Vaudenay's SAS protocol is similar to MANA II. However, it provides significant improvement over MANA II in two aspects. First, the length of the string to be verified in authenticated manner is optimal, that is, one half of the length of the string used by MANA II for the same security level. The second improvement is that the operations performed by the user is reduced. In MANA II the devices must have the data ready in both devices before the verification can start, and the users must indicate the start in both devices. In this manner a "strong authenticated channel" as it is called in [Vau05] is established between the devices. In the SAS protocol this step is not visible to the user thanks to a cryptographic commitment scheme. Our contributions. The SAS protocol for unilateral authentication has three moves over the insecure channel, and the combined protocol for manual cross-authentication of data takes four moves [Vau05] , Annex A. In this paper we show that the number of moves can be reduced to three. This is interesting in theory, but is important also in practise as key agreement by two peer devices typically requires mutual authentication. We also show that the SAS and our new message authentication protocol MA-3 depend heavily on non-malleability of a commitment scheme: one has to give an explicit whitebox security proof unless he explicitly assumes non-malleability of the commitment scheme. As the MA-3 protocol is a general representation of three round protocol where messages are independent from the preceding reply, any other construction without nonmalleability requirement must be more involved. Road-map. Section 2 contains rather lengthy but necessary characterisation of various flavours of commitment schemes and other cryptographic primitives. Section 3 contains description of the SAS and MA-3 protocols along with adversarial models. Section 4 contains constructive counter-examples to show that non-malleability is essential for security proofs. Section 5 contains security proofs for both protocols. Finally, Section 6 contains discussion what are reasonable choices for necessary cryptographic primitives.
Cryptographic preliminaries
Throughout the article we consider algorithms with a bounded working-time t, where t is at least proportional to the length of the program code. Notation g(t) = O(f (t)) denotes asymptotic complexity w.r.t. t, i.e., lim sup t→∞ g(t)/f (t) < ∞. We denote independent random draws from a set X by x ← X . Outputs of a randomised algorithm A are denoted by x ← A. Events are denoted by mnemonic names like events. Keyed hash functions. Cryptographic hash functions are often used to assure data integrity. Shortly put, a keyed hash function h : D × K → T is a two-argument function where the first argument corresponds to a message and the second to a key. Keyed hash function h is ε-almost universal (denoted by ε-AU 2 in terms of [Sti92] ), if for any
A hash function h is uniform if for each x and y the probability that for a randomly chosen k we get h(x, k) = y is 1/|T |. Pseudorandom combiners. Combiner functions are used to combine different inputs into a single output. In the context of key-agreement protocols, combiners must assure randomness of the output even only a single input is chosen uniformly. A combiner f : K 1 × K 2 → K provides such goal if f (r 1 , ·) and f (·, r 2 ) are uniform functions for all r 1 ∈ K 1 and r 2 ∈ K 2 . We call these functions left-right uniform combiners. A combiner is a (t, ε)-pseudorandom permutation if f k (x) = f (k, x) is a (t, ε)-pseudorandom permutation where the first argument plays a role of a secret key.
Commitment schemes. Formally, a commitment scheme is a triple of functionalities Com = (Gen, Com, Open). A setup algorithm Gen generates public parameters pk of the commitment scheme. The commitment function Com pk : M × R → C × D transforms message m ∈ M into a short digest c and a decommitment value d. Usually d = (m, s) where s ∈ R is the used randomness. Finally, correctly formed commitments can be opened, i.e., Open pk (c, d) = m for all (c, d) = Com pk (m, s). Incorrect decommitment values yield to a special abort value ⊥. Binding and hiding properties are basic requirements for commitment schemes. A commitment scheme is (t, ε 1 )-hiding 1 iff any t-time adversary A achieves advantage
A commitment scheme is (t, ε 2 )-binding iff any t-time adversary A achieves advantage
Extractable commitment schemes. Extractable commitment schemes as first defined in [SCP00, Cre02] have slightly different setup algorithm Gen that returns a secret and a public key pair (sk, pk). Commitment and opening functionalities use only the public key and are defined as before. We say that the commitment scheme is (t, ε)-extractable if there is an efficient function Extr sk : C → M that allows to extract messages from valid commitments, more specifically, for any t time adversary A
Obviously, the commitment scheme is not hiding any more if the secret key sk has been leaked out, as one can use sk to extract commitments. Equivocable commitment schemes. An equivocable commitment scheme as defined in [CIO98, DG03] is a tuple of functions (Gen, Com, Com * , Equiv, Open). A setup algorithm Gen returns a public and secret key pair (pk, sk). Commitment and opening functionalities use only the public key and are defined as before. Function Com * sk provides a fake commitment c with the auxiliary information σ ∈ S such that c can be opened to any value using Equiv sk : M × C × S → D, i.e., for all (c, σ) ← Com * sk , x ∈ M we have Open pk (c, Equiv sk (x, c, σ)) = x. Secondly, it should be infeasible to distinguish between true and faked commitments. A commitment scheme is (t, ε)-equivocable iff for any t time adversary A
where World 0 and World 1 denote different environments. In both environments, Gen is run and pk is fed to A. Additionally, A can query commitments for x ∈ M in a black-box way. In World 0 , the corresponding reply is (c, d) ← Com pk (x, s), whereas in World 1 , the pair (c, d) is computed as (c, σ) ← Com * sk and d ← Equiv sk (x, c, σ). Again, the commitment scheme is not binding any more when sk has been leaked out. Non-malleable commitment schemes. Many notions of non-malleable commitments have been proposed in cryptographic literature [CIO98, FF00, DG03] starting from the seminal article [DDN91] by Dolev, Dwork and Naor. All these definitions try to capture requirements that are necessary to defeat man-in-the-middle attacks. We adopt the modernised version of [CIO98]-non-malleability w.r.t. opening-that is slightly weaker than the definition [DG03] . Shortly put, we assume that committed messages are independent from pk that is clearly satisfied in the scope of the article. The choice allows to define non-malleability without a simulator using comparison based security similarly to the framework of non-malleable encryption [BS99] . First, note that the equivalence result between simulation and comparison based definition [BS99] directly generalises to commitments.
2 Secondly, the definition of non-malleable encryption is more strict (non-malleability w.r.t. commitment) and thus CCA secure encryption schemes can be used as non-malleable commitments provided that the public key pk is generated by the trusted party, i.e., non-malleability is achievable in the common reference string model. The latter is a relatively mild assumption in practice, as manufactures of electronic equipment can hardwire a common public key into all devices. Formally, an adversary is a quadruple A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 ) of efficient algorithms where (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) represents an active part of the adversary that creates and afterwards tries to open related commitments and A 4 represents a target relation or a distinguisher. The relation A 4 is completely specified before seeing a decommitment of the challenge commitment. A succeeds if A 4 can distinguish between two environments World 0 and World 1 . In both environments, Gen is run to produce pk and then 1. A 1 (pk) outputs a description of an efficient message sampler M 0 and a state σ 1 , then
and a commitment vector (c 1 , . . . , c n ) with arbitrary length that does not contain c.
If some y i = ⊥ then A is halted with 0. 4. Finally, in the environment World 0 we invoke A 4 (x 0 , y 1 , . . . , y n , σ 2 ) whereas in World 1 we invoke A 4 (x 1 , y 1 , . . . , y n , σ 2 ).
A commitment scheme is (t, ε)-non-malleable iff for any t time adversary
CCA security of commitment schemes. A commitment scheme is secure under a chosen commitment attack if it is (t, ε 1 )-hiding and (t, ε 2 )-binding even if adversary A can use any decommitment oracle O dec in a nontrivial manner. Given a commitment c, oracle
Querying of the challenge commitment is not allowed. For perfectly binding commitments there is a unique opening, otherwise many possibilities emerge. Then it is conceptually easier to imagine that the adversary prescribes the target message x to O dec when scheme is non-binding. The latter makes the environment similar to equivocable commitments. However, for CCA secure commitment schemes, a single double decommitment should not jeopardise security of other commitments. Many non-binding commitment schemes like [Ped91, FO97] do not satisfy this requirement, i.e., CCA security of non-binding commitments is much more restrictive than equivocability.
Relations between commitment schemes. Obviously, any (t, ε)-non-malleable commitment scheme is (τ, 2ε)-hiding and (τ, ε)-binding with τ = t − O(1), since either A 2 or A 3 can send information about x 0 to A 4 . Equivocability does not imply nonmalleability as shown in Theorem 2. Although latter seems paradoxical, since historically non-malleable commitments were constructed from equivocable ones [CIO98] , there is no contradiction, as authors use equivocable commitments in a more complex construction to achieve non-malleability. Extractability does not imply non-malleability and vice versa. Finally, CCA security implies non-malleability as shown in Theorem 8.
Manual authentication with short authenticated strings 3.1 Protocol description
In our setting, two honest parties Alice and Bob have non-confidential inputs m a and m b and they want to establish a shared common public output m a ||m b in a malicious environment. Besides in-band messages parties can send short out-of-band (OOB) messages in authenticated manner. The total length of OOB-messages should be as small as possible. On the other hand, short OOB-messages cannot provide negligible failure probability against man-in-the-middle attacks. In the following, we analyse and generalise the unilateral three round 5 message authentication protocol SAS by Vaudenay [Vau05] The SAS protocol has a few minor shortcomings. First, the commitment incorporates non-confidential message m a though the latter can be shortened to h(m a ) where h is a collision resistant. Still the dependence between m a and c is undesirable, as using longer commitments is more time-consuming. Secondly, the protocol does not provide mutual authentication. Running two copies of the SAS protocol yields a four round mutual authentication protocol but the latter is not round optimal. Also, the formal security proofs given by Vaudenay are slightly incorrect, see discussion in Subsection 4.2. These shortcomings inspired us to design and analyse a three round mutual authentication protocol depicted as Fig. 3 where h is a keyed hash function (MAC) and f pseudorandom permutation e.g. 128-bit AES encryption. The protocol is more modu- lar: commitments are independent of messages, authenticity is guaranteed by the MAC similarly to MANA II. The effective bit size = log 2 |T | of control values check determines achievable security. Since m b might be computed after the first round, the MA-3 protocol can be naturally combined with any key-exchange protocol. See the discussion below about security in arbirary context. As the control values check are -bit short, the probability of random guessing is 2 − . Therefore, we cannot guarantee deception probability below 2 − . Our aim is to prove that deception probability is negligibly bigger than 2 − . Security in arbitrary context. Classical composition theorems [Gol04] assure that one can sequentially compose protocols that are secure in stand-alone model and the resulting protocol has only a cumulative security drop. Though the latter is generally not true for concurrent composition, we can prove that both the SAS and the MA-3 protocols , m 2 , . . . , m k ) . Since the transcript must be fixed before the third round, the secured protocol has one extra round and we loose only ε in security, except for single round protocols that have two extra rounds.
Adversarial models
are secure in any computational context if Alice and Bob follow the protocol and values r a and r b are not used in other protocols. Due to the lack of space we do not formalise the claim completely. Essentially, if Alice and Bob follow the protocol and do not use m a ||m b in the computations before the end of the authentication, then protocol messages can be perfectly simulated by the adversary himself, as m a and m b are public. Compared to the ideal implementation, where adversary can only observe messages and decide whether to drop them or not, we loose ε in security for each message. Batch authentication of several messages can be used to preserve security level. In particular, all key-exchange protocols can be secured by authenticating a protocol transcript (m 1
Necessary requirements to building-blocks
Next, we derive minimal security requirements for building-blocks that are necessary to prove security of the MA-3 and SAS protocols using standard black-box reductions.
Mutual authentication
Note that any three round mutual authentication protocol where second and third messages are independent from previous replies has a form depicted in Fig. 3 , since knowledge of first and third message must allow to compute r a and from the second message it must be possible to compute r b . Therefore, following analysis provides quite general characterisation of properties required from Com, f and h. In the following, we assume that f is a left-right uniform combiner instead of pseudorandom permutation. The assumption is not essential, rather a natural simplification. Since the set of possible control values T is small, the hash function h must satisfy unconditional security guarantees. As the success of simple substitution attack is Pr [h(m a ||m b , k) = h(m a ||m b , k)], then h must be at least ε-almost universal. A well known lower bound [Sar80] on ε states that ε ≥ |D|−|T | |T |(|D|−1) for any hash function family h : D × K → T provided that keys are chosen randomly and thus the lower bound on failure is indeed ε 2 − for all practical message sizes. Next, we show that a specific form non-malleability of the commitment scheme is necessary. We construct a specific hash function such that flipping a last bit allows successful deception and then we convert an ordinary commitment scheme into a malleable one that permits the necessary bit flip. Let h 0 be a hash function with key space K 0 . Given two different target messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ D, define h with extended key space K = K 0 × {0, 1} by the following rule
Let Com = (Gen, Com, Open) be a commitment scheme with message space K and let g : K × C → K be an efficient deterministic function. Fix C • = {0, 1} × C and define Com
• × D and Open
• pk procedures in the following way
i.e., setting an evil bit b allows to manipulate commitments. Let us denote such a commitment scheme by Com g .
Theorem 2. Let
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Appendix B contains the proof and more detailed discussion of separation results and their implications. Proof. Obviously, since f (r a , r b ) ⊕ f (r a ⊕ 1, r b ) = 1. The latter shows that sending r b in a scrambled way does not help as g b (r, c) = r.
Corollary 1. Let f be a combiner such that there exists efficiently computable functions
We could not find a constructive counterexample for general class of combiners instead we used oracle separation to eliminate possibility of black-box proofs. We have to show that in the oracle world the modified Com is still hiding and binding.
Theorem 3. Let f be a left-right uniform combiner and Com a commitment scheme that remains hiding and binding commitment even if f (·, r) can be efficiently inverted for all r ∈ K. Then there exists an oracle world where the MA-3 protocol is insecure, but
Binding is straightforward-we can perfectly simulate O as honest Com pk calls provide a decommitment and we can use inversion oracle for f (·, r). Thus, the advantage remains, only the working time increases to O(t log t), since we have to manage a table of tuples. Lets establish that hiding is also preserved. Assume that Com is (τ, ε 1 )-hiding and (τ, ε 2 )-binding in the plain model where τ = O(t log t) is large enough but a t time adversary A achieves Adv Theorem 3 shows that there are no black-box security proofs of MA-3 that assume only binding and hiding from commitment scheme, i.e. we have to assume some kind of nonmalleability of Com or provide explicit white-box security proof for an instantiation of the MA-3.
The SAS protocol
Note that the SAS protocol requires non-malleable commitment as we can define function g : M → M so that g(m 0 ||r a ) = m 1 ||r a . Vaudenay assumed that commitment returns only r a and m a is explicitly included in the decommitment value d but clearly this is a cosmetic difference.
Theorem 4. Let Com
g be a g-malleable but (t, ε)-hiding and (t, ε)-binding commitment scheme. Then the SAS protocol is insecure.
Proof. Recall that protocol is insecure if for some valid input protocol fails with probability 1. Let Alice's input be m 0 . Then given a commitment (0, c), Charlie forwards (1, c) to Bob and sends r b directly to Alice. Charlie forwards decommitment value d to Bob, who obtains m 1 ||r a . Bob accepts outputs m 1 since he got the correct r a .
Corollary 3. Extractability or equivocability are not sufficient to guarantee security of the SAS protocol.
Results indicate that the proofs of Theorem 5 of [Vau05] are incorrect. Indeed, in the case of extractable commitments sk is used to win the hiding game that is absurd, since after the secret key sk has been leaked there is no privacy guarantees. Similarly, it does not make sense to use sk and faked commitments to beat the binding game, since a leakage of sk removes binding guarantees. Nevertheless, the original proof is valid if one assumes CCA security from the commitment scheme, since the proof actually uses calls to decommitment oracle to win the hiding and binding games. On the other hand, CCA security implies non-malleability. Use of more advanced combiner f (m a , r a , r b ) does not alleviate the security requirements as it is equivalent to MA-3 with empty m b .
Security proofs
Let forge denote the event that the adversary A succeeds, i. An authentication protocol is (t, ε)-secure in the stand-alone model if for any t time adversary A, we have Adv msg-for (A) ≤ ε. As both protocols are asynchronous, the adversary can deliver messages before they are sent. Denote by send(i) that the ith message was sent and recv(i) that the ith message was received by honest parties. Then causal relations send(1) ≺ recv(2) ≺ send(3) and recv(1) ≺ send(2) ≺ recv(3) still hold. In the following we divide execution paths to classes. An execution path is almost normal (denoted as norm) if execution second round is completed before the third round is started recv(1), recv(2), send(1), send(2) ≺ send(3) , recv(1), recv(2), send(1), send(2) ≺ recv(3) .
An execution path is abnormal (denoted as ¬norm) if one of the conditions is violated, i.e., one of the mutually exclusive events
happens. Further analysis shows that abnormal executions fail with high probability provided that the commitment scheme is hiding and binding. Almost normal execution is secure under more restrictive assumptions.
Lemma 1. For any t there exists
τ = t + O(1) such that if Com is (τ, ε 1 )-hiding, f is (τ, ε 5 )
-pseudorandom and h a uniform hash function. Then for any t time adversary
for the SAS and the MA-3 protocols.
Proof. Since send(2) ≺ recv(3) ≺ recv(2) ≺ send(3), then values c , r b , d , r b are fixed before the adversary sees a decommitment value d. In particular, check b is also fixed before send(3) and C succeeds if he guesses the value of c. More formally, we can convert C into a distinguisher A (the next construction is for the SAS protocol):
1. Choose r a ← K and send m a ||r a as a challenge x 0 . 2. Given c b simulate protocol until recv(2). If recv(2) ≺ recv(3) then halt with 0.
3. Compute check a = r a ⊕ r b and check b = r a ⊕ r b output 1 iff they coincide.
If b = 0 then protocol is perfectly simulated and A outputs 1 with the probability Pr [forge ∧ recv(3) ≺ recv (2)]. If b = 1 then the protocol run is independent of r a and Pr [r a ⊕ r b = r a ⊕ r b ] = 2 − . As a result we get
and the first claim follows. For the MA-3 protocol the construction is exactly the same, except x 0 = r a and check values are computed differently. Similarly, r a is independent from the simulated protocol run when b = 1. Since f is (τ, ε 5 )-pseudorandom the check a is also (τ − O(1), ε 5 )-pseudorandom and hence the second claim follows.
Lemma 2. Assume that A is a t-time adversary and let f be a right-uniform combiner and h a uniform hash function. If Com is perfectly binding, then for both protocols
Otherwise Com must be (τ, ε 2 )-binding with τ = 56αt ε 2 (1−ε2) for a constant 6 α to assure
where ε 2 > 4 · 2 − for the SAS and ε 2 > 4 · |K b | −1 for the MA-3 protocol.
Proof. Since recv(2) ≺ send(3) ≺ send(2) then m a , c , m b , r b is sent before r b , hence check a is fixed before the adversary sees r b . Similarly to the proof of Lemma 1, choosing r a independently from r b leads to a success probability 2 − and the first claim follows. For general case, the adversary must double open commitments to achieve a better success. Still, we need replies r 
− · |K| keys that correspond to check a . As a result the effective probability
for the MA-3 protocol. Corollary 4 assures that there is a Theorem 5. Let t be a desired time bound. Let Com be (τ 2 , ε 2 )-binding. If Com is perfectly binding set ε 2 = 0, otherwise set ε 2 = max {4 · 2 − , 56α/(τ 2 (1 − ε 2 ))} where α is a known small constant. Then there exist τ 1 = t + O(1) and τ 3 = O(t) such that if Com is (τ 1 , ε 1 )-hiding and (τ 3 , ε 3 )-non-malleable commitment scheme then the SAS protocol is (t, 2
Proof. Let C be a malicious environment that achieves Adv msg-for (C) > 2 − + ε 1 + ε 2 + ε 3 and let m a be the corresponding input. We build an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 ) that can break non-malleability of the commitment scheme. A 1 outputs a description of uniform distribution over {m a } × K and σ 1 = (pk, m a ). Given c, σ 1 , A 2 simulates the protocol with r b ← K and stops before send(3). In case of abnormal execution (1) or c = c , A halts with 0. Otherwise, A 2 outputs a commitment c and σ 2 containing enough information to resume the simulation and (r b , r b ). Given d, σ 2 , A 3 resumes the simulation and outputs d as a decommitment value. If A 3 was successful in opening then A 4 gets x = m a ||r a , y 1 = m a ||r a and σ 2 containing (r b , r b ). A 4 computes two check values check a = r a ⊕ r b and check b = r a ⊕ r b and outputs 1 if check a = check b . As only abnormal execution, c = c or a protocol failure Open pk (c , d ) = ⊥ causes a premature halting of A, we get
Combining the result with Lemmas 1 and 2, we get a desired contradiction Proof. Let C be a malicious environment that achieves Adv msg-for (C) > 2 − +2ε 1 +ε 2 + ε 3 + ε 4 + 3ε 5 and let m a , m b be the corresponding input. We build an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 ) that can break non-malleability of the commitment scheme. A 1 outputs a description of uniform distribution over K a and σ 1 = (pk, m a , m b ). Given c, σ 1 , A 2 simulates the protocol with r b ← K b and stops before send(3). In case of abnormal execution (1) 
as for random key k, the control value h(m a ||m b , k) has uniform distribution and f is a (τ 1 , ε 5 )-pseudorandom function. Since Com is (τ 1 , ε 1 )-hiding and f pseudorandom and h is ε 4 -almost universal, we get by hybrid argument
where in the third inequality corresponds to more precise combined hybrid argument.
Combining the results with Lemmas 1 and 2 and we get a desired contradiction
Remark 1. Note that in all proofs we needed that f is (τ 1 , ε 5 )-pseudorandom permutation only if adversary can query at most two values of f .
Suggested implementation
To implement the protocol, one has to fix a hash function, a non-malleable commitment scheme and good pseudorandom combiner. For the commitment scheme there are essentially two alternatives either we use relatively slow asymmetric primitives or relay on fast symmetric cryptography. The choice is not a clear-cut and depends on desired security goals. In a nutshell, asymmetric methods provide provable high level security that might be considered unnecessary as total failure probability is above 2 − . Example construction of commitment schemes. The simplest construction of a nonmalleable commitment scheme is based on a CCA2 secure encryption scheme. Let Enc pk : M × R → C be deterministic encryption rule where r ∈ R denotes randomness used to encrypt a message. Define (c, d) ← Com pk (x, r) as c = Enc pk (x, r) and d = (x, r) and Open pk (c, d) = m if Enc pk (x, r) = c and ⊥ otherwise. Then the corresponding commitment scheme is CCA secure provided that pk is generated by a trusted party. For some encryption schemes participants can generate pk themselves. We suggest Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98] as the public key is a random triple of group elements and there is no need for trusted party. Nevertheless, both parties must have the same key pk since a priory non-malleability w.r.t. single public key does not guarantee non-malleability w.r.t. related keys pk 1 and pk 2 . Another alternative is RSA-OAEP that is CCA secure in a random oracle model [FOPS01] . Even more heuristic way to construct non-malleable commitments is based on collision resistant hash functions. If we define (c, d) ← Com(x, r) with c = h(x, r) and d = (x, r), there are no guarantees for hiding. Nevertheless, if we use hash function with OAEP padding
then the commitment scheme is provably hiding and binding in the random oracle model provided that h is collision resistant. The security proof [FOPS01] of the OAEP padding assumes that h is a partial-domain one-way permutation. More specifically, it should be infeasible to find s given h(s, t), s ← D 1 , t ← D 2 . The partial one-wayness follows from one-wayness provided that h is at least (t, ε)-one-way function with |D 2 | t. The other assumption that h is a permutation is important in the proof. Therefore, we can only conjecture that the proof can be generalised and OAEP provides a CCA secure commitment scheme. Since hash-commitments are not perfectly-binding, Lemma 2 requires that the commitment is (τ, ε 2 )-binding where τ is inversely proportional to ε 2 . The impact of ε 2 is irrelevant as long ε 2 < 1/2. Shortly put, birthday paradox assures that for k bit hash values ε 2 ≤ c · 2 −k/2 · t −1 , c < 1 and therefore hash values must be quite long to get reasonable security guarantees. Example constructions of combiners. Ideally, we should use left-right uniform combiner that is also pseudorandom w.r.t. 2 calls of f . If we set K a = {0, 1} 2m and K b = {0, 1} m then the most natural combiner f (x 0 ||x 1 , y) = x 0 y + x 1 over the Galois field GF(2 m ) is indeed (∞, 0)-pseudorandom. On the other hand, r a is twice as long as the hash key. As commitments are the computational bottleneck of the protocol, an appealing alternative is to use AES with 128-bit key to compute f (x 1 || . . . ||x s , y 1 || . . . ||y s ) = AES(x 1 , y 1 )|| . . . ||AES(x s , y s ) on 128-bit blocks. Example constructions of hash families Constructions of ε-AU 2 hash families have the property that the value of ε depends on the length of message inputs. In our application the tag space T is relatively small and it is desired that ε ≈ 1/ |T |. As shown in [BJKS05] the effect of message length can be eliminated using constructions based on concatenation of hash families. Towards this end the following composition theorem from [Sti92] is useful.
Theorem 7.
If there exists an ε 1 -AU 2 hash family H 1 = {f : D → T 1 } and an ε 2 -AU 2 hash family H 2 = {g : T 1 → T 2 }, then there exist an ε-AU 2 hash family H of hash functions from D to T 2 , where ε ≤ ε 1 + ε 2 . If, moreover, the hash functions of the second family H 2 are uniform, then also the hash functions of the family H are uniform.
The hash functions in H are constructed as composed functions of hash function in H 1 and H 2 . Let be the length of the final tag in bits, and assume that all messages in the set D have at most 2 blocks of 2 bits. Then we can construct an 2 − -AU 2 hash family H 1 from the message space D and with tag length of 2 bits as follows. Let GF(2 2 ) be a Galois field of 2 2 elements. We denote by x 0 ||x 1 || . . . ||x m−1 the message blocks of x, where x i ∈ GF(2 2 ) and m < 2 . For k 1 ∈ K 1 = GF(2 2 ) we set f k1 (x) = x m−1 k m−1 1 + . . . + x 1 k 1 + x 0 over GF(2 2 ) .
Then it can be shown that the family H 1 = {f k1 } is 2 − -AU 2 hash family. The second hash family H 2 is defined similarly with message space GF(2 2 ), with the key space K 2 = GF(2 ), and with the tag space T = GF(2 ). The family H 2 consists of all functions g k2 of the form g k2 (y 0 ||y 1 ) = y 1 k 2 + y 0 over GF(2 ) .
The family H 2 is an 2 − +1 -AU 2 hash family. By Theorem 7 the family H consisting of hash functions h k1,k2 = g k2 • f k1 is then ε-AU 2 hash family with ε = 2 − +2 , and key space K = K 1 × K 2 consisting of strings of 3 bits.
A CCA security implies non-malleability Theorem 8. Let Com be (t, ε 1 )-hiding and (t, ε 2 )-binding under chosen commitment attack. If Com is perfectly binding, then Com is (τ, 2ε 1 )-non-malleable, otherwise, Com is (τ, ε 2 )-non-malleable for τ = 2t + O(1).
Proof. PERFECTLY-BINDING. First ε-security against real-or-random game implies security against left-or-right game where the adversary outputs both x 0 and x 1 . Now consider an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 ) that has Adv nm (A) > 2ε. Then B chooses x 0 , x 1 ← M 0 . Now given c b , B simulates the game until A 2 outputs σ 2 and (c 1 , . . . , c n ) . Use decommitment oracle to find corresponding vector (y 1 , . . . , y n ). Output the end result of A 4 (x 0 , y 1 , . . . , y n , σ 2 ). Clearly, we provide perfect simulation World b , except we do not terminate when A 3 fails. Fortunately, the latter term cancels out due to the symmetry and Adv 
